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Abstract
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of several reliability analyses or
assessments applied to battery cells to be utilized in typical Electrical Power
Subsystems for spacecraft in LEO missions. FTA is generally the process of
reviewing and analytically examining a system or equipment in such a way to
emphasize the lower-level fault occurrences which directly or indirectly
contribute to the major fault or top-level event. This Qualitative FTA addresses
the potential of occurrence for five specific top-level events: HYDROGEN
LEAKAGE through either discrete leakage paths or through pressure vessel
rupture; and, four distinct modes of performance degradation - HIGH CHARGE
VOLTAGE, SUPPRESSED DISCHARGE VOLTAGE, LOSS OF CAPACITY, and
HIGH P_
Relationship Between Reality, System Model, and Decim'on Process
Figure 1 schematically depicts one decision making process wherein we may
explore the relationship between reality, some model of our system, and the
decision process. REALITY is defined by a system of internal and external
boundaries. OUR PERCEPTION OF REALITY is defined by the Fault Tree.
BASIS FOR DECISION, in this case some measured acceptance of ri_k, is
justified by the degree to which redesign, qualification tests on part,: and
materials and discrete inspection or test points were utilized. Figure 2 illustrates
a generic system to be analyzed with external and internal boundaries. Hence,
ITEM E is the Power Sub-System and ITEM F is the Battery Assembly wherein
items a-to-r would be individual cells.
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FIGURE 2: SYSTEM DEFINITION: EXTERNAL AND
INTERNAL BOUNDARIES
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The external boundaries describe the interface which the battery assembly, and
ultimately the individual cells, experiences in the LEO mission profile. A typical
profile requires continuous duty in combination with a solar array to store energy
for use during peak power demands and eclipse periods, and may include:
a) 35% Depth of Discharge within 35 to 40 minutes followed by a
C/1.67 rate recharge in 50 to 60 minutes
b) nominal temperature range of 0 to 30°C
c) a dynamic mechanical environment during the launch phase
including a wide, but well defined spectrum, of random vibration;
typical sustained acceleration of 20 g; and broad range of shock
spectra
d) life and reliability requirements including on station calendar life
of 5.5 years MTBF and a design cycle life of 41,000 cycles
The internal boundaries are described by the cell design and include the
rudimentary details such as pressure vessel material composition and thickness,
and the electrochemical characteristics of the nickel-hydrogen couple as well as
the decision to use a recirculating stack design.
The degree to which a fault described in the Fault Tree may result in battery
failure or performance degradation is masked somewhat by the availability of in-
flight data; this could be equated to the Limit of Resolution in our generic system
of Figure 2. The degree to which the actual mission profile conforms to the
intended profile combined with the ability of the NiH 2 cell to perform its intended
function, irregardless of the nonconformance, is a measure of "robustness of
design."
Basics of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA}
Figure 3 illustrates symbols typical of those used in our NiH 2 FTA; numerous
others are available see Reference 2. The rectangle contains a brief description of
the top-level event and appears at top of the tree. The rectangle is also used in this
tree to signify a lower-level event and contains a brief description; these lower-
level events occur throughout the tree and have both their input and output from a
logic gate. The circle represents a basic or the lowest-level event which may cause
a fault to occur and is used as an input to a logic gate. The diamond is a transfer
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FIGURE 3: FAULT TREE SYMBOLOGY
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function and is used to signify a connection between two or more sections of the
fault tree. Logic Gates include the OR Gate for which output occurs when one or
more of the input events occur; whereas, the AND Gate only occurs if all the
inputs exist simultaneously.
Failure Effects, Failure Mode, and Failure Mechanism
Understanding and defining how a specific failure mechanism produces a
discrete failure mode which may effect system operation is important for
determining the proper inter-relationships among the events. In addition, the
orientation of the analysis, that is whether to concentrate on system response
symptoms or specific signatures generated by active components, determines both
the success of the analysis and the effectiveness of resulting remedial actions.
Failure Effects: what are the effects of the failure, if any, on the system. Failure
Mode: what aspect, condition, or position is of concern. Failure Mechanism:
what particular mechanism or vehicle prompts the failure mode to occur and
what likelihood of occurrence exists. Thereafter, failures may be classified as to
component, environmental, human, or software. Component failures occur at
the lowest level of examination and may in fact be discrete parts or materials.
Environmental failures occur when the system is placed in an environment
which the system was not designed to operate in and where overstress has now
occurred. Human failures occur due to operator error and are most difficult to
quantify given the unpredictably of humans in the elevated stress levels typically
accompanying sophisticated, high reliability systems. Software failures are
simply errors in the controlling software, but may be considered a sub-set of
human failures or component failures. Notwithstanding these failure
definitions, their existence simply becomes the further definition of internal and
external boundaries of the system under analysis.
Top-Down Approach of the Fault Tree versus Bottoms-Up Approach of the
FMECA
The top-down approach of the FTA presupposes sufficient examination of the
system to enumerate the top-level events or major system performance failures.
Thus, the examination and resulting analyses are limited to events which cause
the top event to occur. This deductive approach postulates the opportunity for top
level failure thereafter reconstructing events or behavior at the lower levels which
contribute to this failure. The bottoms-up approach of the FMECA is inductive in
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nature. This approach postulates numerous faults or initiating conditions and
then attempts to determine the effect of that fault or condition on system operation
and integrity. Generally, the FMECA tends to be initially more descriptive as a
risk analysis and risk reduction tool because their format typically includes
existing/projected compensation or control measures.
Qualitative Fault Tree for NiH 2 LEO
The discussion of faults versus failures necessarily assumes that the fault
condition is of sufficient significance and magnitude to cause upper level failure
events. Therefore, the role of various contaminants is not an idle reference in the
fault tree of Figures 4 thru 22. There is no further assumpt:on nor is there an
attempt to yet quantify the level of contamination since some contaminants in
small ppm may cause significant events which may lead to failure. No further
assumption as regards passive versus active components and their significance is
made either. When we analyze the pressure vessel for catastrophic burst and find
the present design to leak before burst, there can not be an accompanying
assumption which relegates this vessel to a passive component. The fault tree
clearly shows a leaking pressure vessel to be an active contributor to upsetting the
electrochemistry of the nickel-hydrogen couple which may eventually lead to
either outright failure or performance degradation.
Five specific primary faults or top-level events addressed in the fault trees of
Figure 4 are: HYDROGEN LEAKAGE through either discrete leakage paths or
through pressure vessel rupture (discounted as a potential failure _hrough both
this analysis and the Fracture Control Plan); and four distinct modes of
performance degradation (1) HIGH CHARGE VOLTAGE, (2) SUPPRESSED
DISCHARGE VOLTAGE, (3) LOSS OF CAPACITY, and (4) HIGH PRESSURE.
Hydrogen Leakage
The critical fault, hydrogen leakage, was created in the classical fault tree
analysis. By assuming the worst case scenario it was determined that the
hydrogen leakage was and is the worst possible fault. All construction techniques
were assessed from the top down to determine the different paths the leakage
might occur. This event is typical of most NiH 2 pressure vessels and presents a
generic path of construction criticality. By placing probabilities in each of the
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lower fault events a manufacturer will be able to construct a detailed quantitative
fault tree.
High Charge Voltage
This fault is divided into three generic failure modes of which two are identical to
Loss of Capacity. These generic failure modes are further divided into specific
failure modes which can be identified or traced back to respective FMEA failure
modes. Some of these failure modes have been traced to their failure causes.
These expanded fault trees may have no failure modes associated with them
because either they are failure causes or are under review for inclusion into the
growing Operational FMEA database.
High Pressure
Only two generic failure modes cause high pressure and one is unique to this
fault. The flooding of the negative membrane is an operational fault that is a
result of various contamination failures. We do not have FMEA worksheets filled
out for contamination as it usually is identified in various FMEA worksheets as a
failure cause.
Loss of Capacity
This fault tree is the least extensive of the operational critical faults. This is
because it is associated with wearout mechanisms of the NiH 2 battery cell that are
not modeled and has duplicity in other failure modes. The purpose of this fault
tree is to show unique failure mechanisms associated with just Loss of Capacity.
The loss of capacity has been divided into two larger groups of generic failure
modes. These in turn have been broken down into other root causes and easily
identifiable failure modes.
Suppressed Discharge Voltage
This fault tree is broken down into three specific failure modes identified by the
operational FMEA worksheet numbers and one failure mode associated with
NiH 2 wearout. A particularly interesting feature of this fault tree is that both
hard and soft shorts can be caused by conductive particles. The conductive
particle fault tree shows how these particles can be inherent to a fault process or
introduced as foreign particles from material handling.
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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
on Gates NiH 2 Battery for LEO Mission
FMEA NO. CA-4B
Critical Item (YeslNo) Yes
Item Name:
Hardware Location:
System: _L_
Subsystem:
Reference D(sim_tor:
Hardware (Including Redundancy)
Verification:
(A)
(1) Prelaunch PASS
(2) On Orbit FAIL
(Appropriate Mission Phases)
Document Number: RAC NiH2 Battery FMEA
Document/Revision Date:
Critical Category: 1
Failure Effect Phase
_..__(A) Prelaunch
__._(B) Transportation
X (C) Assembly
__.._(D) Permanently Manned Capability (PMC)
Is Function Restorable on Orbit? Battery Cell Only
TBD
ORU Failure Detectability:
EVA Required (Yes/No): TDB
Reliability Analysis Center
Prepared By: D. Rash
Approved By: G. Ebel
Approved By:
Approved By:
Gates Battery
Poor weld ouality (cracks. inclusions, low stren_h, porous)
Failure Cause(s); Imvrooer material choices. Imnroper weld technioues: Irrem.flarities in weld
surfaces: Weld surfaces contaminated: Weld gas contaminated: Inadeauate purge gas flow
Failure Detection/Verificati0n: Physical. visual, pressure and leakage tests
Correction Action: (A) Short Term: Article insnection
(B) Long Term: Control welding orocess
Failure Effect On: (A) Crew_BD
(B)
(D)
Rational for Acceptability:
(,Note: Rational for
Acceptability is applicable
to CIL Items only)
(A) _ Safety factor of 3 for burstJonerationg pressure & safety
factor of 4 for burst/operating cycles
(B) Test Hydrogen leak_ chemical leak. cycle, burst and proof tests
(C) Inspection First article and first Diece
(D)
(E) Operations
(F) Maintainability N/A
Remarks/Hazards: HAZARD POTENTIAL - Leakaze of Hydrogen
FIGURE 23
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Establishing Parity with the FMECA
An example of a completed failure mode effects analysis worksheet (Figure 23) is
provided to demonstrate how the failure causes are attributed to fault events, in
this case Girth Weld Breakdown. The numbering system has been assigned to
manufacturing flow steps and the example is FMEA number CA-4B. The failure
mode corresponds directly to an event that has three distinct events associated to
the upper level event.
Conclusion
The decision process for either qualitative or quantitative analyses is tempered by
our view of reality and some model of our system under anlaysis; and, further
constrained by our expectations of the external boundaries and robustness of the
design. The Fault Tree Analysis is not a stand alone technique due to the top
down approach which presupposes the determination of all Top-level or Major
fault events; however, the Fault Tree when in a graphic, visual format is an
excellent tool for technical reviews. Fault Tree Analyses can be quantified in
areas such as System Assessment, Confidence Analysis, and Sensitivity
Analysis. The Qualitative Fault Tree Analysis for NiH 2 cells in LEO Mission
identifies and analyzes five specific Top-Level failure events; quantification of this
Fault Tree has already begun.
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